Introduction
We consider the classical "voting"problem, when n agents have to jointly choose one common alternative from a given set A = fa 1 ; :::; a w g. Or goal is investigate plausible systematic preference aggregating mechanisms (rules) for this problem, which do not use monetary transfers.
When preferences over A di¤er substantially, it might be di¢ cult to choose an alternative agents would consider a good compromise. One way to overcome this problem is to allow for an outcome to be a lottery over A, or a vector of "shares" of alternatives, rather then a unique alternative. Potentially, any probability distribution p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ) 2 A can be jointly chosen as an outcome. We may interpret p as a real lottery to be performed. Hence, the …nal ex-post outcome still would be a single "pure" alternative. However, agents might regard the process (if not the outcome) as more fair. Alternatively, p may be interpreted as a vector of "time-shares", fractions of total time each alternative is in place. Which interpretation is more appropriate, depends on the particular economic situation. We abstract from it and concentrate on the formal model, which encompasses both.
A prominent paper by Gibbard [9] on this random social choice model restricts attention to the "ordinal" mechanisms. Agents are assumed to have strict preferences over A, and are only asked about their orderings of pure alternatives. It is implicitly assumed though, that they have cardinal utilities over the alternatives, and compare lotteries based on the expected utility. This assumption gives rise to a strong requirement of "strategy-proofness": a rule is non-manipulable only if an agent can never gain (no matter what are her cardinal utilities behind) by altering her ordinal input. Gibbard [9] characterizes all strategy-proof mechanisms. Follow-up works were also mainly concerned with non-manipulability.
When we allow for indi¤erences in agents' preferences, assignment of private goods becomes a particular case of voting model (each agent is indi¤erent between all assignments which give her the same thing). Ordinal random assignment model, with indivisible goods and no monetary transfers, became a very active area of research in recent 10-15 years. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] proposed to look at the ordinal random assignment mechanisms (agents are only required to report preferences over deterministic alternatives). They introduced, for the strict preference domain, a new "Serial rule", which is computed allowing agents to acquire ("eat") shares of objects simultaneously with the same constant speed, in decreasing order of their preferences. While it only satis…es a week version of non-manipulability, its fairness and e¢ ciency properties are very strong. In particular, it is not only anonymous, but also envy-free. Serial rule became one of the most studied ordinal mechanisms (another one is Random Priority). Several generalizations were proposed. Bogomolnaia, Moulin [4] introduced Egalitarian rule for the dichotomous assignment domain. Katta, Sethuraman [10] extended the de…nition of Serial rule to the full domain (indi¤erences are allowed), which is also an extension of the above Egalitarian rule from dichotomous domain. Several recent papers (see, for example [6] , [7] , and, for the full domain, [8] ) provided axiomatic characterizations of Serial rule, mostly by means of e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and some type of monotonicity with respect to certain changes in preferences. Bogomolnaia [2] proposes an alternative de…nition, or a characterization, of Serial rule, both for strict and full domain. Given an arbitrary random assignment, one can calculate, for each agent i, her total share t i (k) of goods from her k best indi¤erence classes. Serial rule happens to be the unique one which leximin maximizes vector t = (t i (k)) i;k . Thus, arguably, Serial rule emerges as the (unique) most egalitarian random rule, when social planner is restricted to ordinal information only. This result also serves as a justi…cation of the extension of Serial rule to the full domain, proposed in [10] . It shows that this generalization is indeed in the same spirit as Serial (or Egalitarian) rule, aiming at the ordinally-egalitarian goal.
Returning to the random voting problem, now over full domain (indi¤erences allowed), Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose a random social choice (voting) rule which they call Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR). This rule is based on the same "simultaneous eating" ideas as Serial rule. Indeed, ESR is introduced as a joint generalization of two rules. One is Serial rule, introduced in [3] , [4] , and [10] for strict, dichotomous, and full private goods domain, and another is Egalitarian random voting rule, de…ned in [5] on the dichotomous voting preference domain. Aziz and Stursberg [1] show that on the assignment domain ESR coincides with Serial rule and on the dichotomous domain it coincides with the Egalitarian voting rule. In order to show the equivalence with Serial rule for assignment domain, they rely on a recent characterization result, [8] , which singles out Serial rule on full domain by ordinal e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and "limited invariance" (the proof in [8] is long and complicated). Aziz and Stursberg [1] check that ESR satis…es those three properties on the assignment domain. The checks, while not very complicated, are also rather long and non-intuitive. Note also, that the notion of envy-freeness looses its meaning beyond the domain of private goods'assignment. While ESR remains ordinally e¢ cient and satis…es limited invariance on the full domain, those properties do not single it out. This, while ESR is one of possible generalizations of Serial rule, the question remains whether it is the most appropriate one.
Current work proposes an alternative de…nition (or a characterization) of ESR, along the same lines as the alternative de…nition of Seral rule, proposed in Bogomolnaia [2] . It shows that ESR is the unique leximin maximizer of the vector
is the total share agent i gets in lottery p from her top k indi¤erence classes). An immediate corollary, given the result in Bogomolnaia [2] , is an alternative, much more straightforward, way to show that ESR is indeed an extension of Serial rule to the larger domain.
Our main result can be illustrated by the following interpretation. Fix a lottery p. Split each agent in as many "sub-agents"as the number of indi¤erence classes in her preferences. Agent i's …rst sub-agent only cares about her …rst indi¤erent class, her second sub-agent only cares about her two top indi¤erent classes, etc. Thus, the utility of agent i's k-th sub-agent is measured by the total amount of objects she gets from her …rst k indi¤erence classes, i.e. t p i (k). Our result is that ESR rule maximizes the leximin ("Rawlsian") collective utility of those sub-agents. It …rst attempts to maximize the utility of the worst-o¤ sub-agent, then the utility of the second worst-o¤ one, and so on.
Rephrasing, the ESR allocation is the most egalitarian (the Rawlsian maximizer) in attempting to equalize agents' shares of top ranked objects (i.e. of upper counter sets of objects) under di¤erent cuto¤s. Recall that agents only report rankings of objects, not their relative valuations, so equalizing allocated shares for di¤erent upper counter sets seems to be the best available instrument for an egalitarian mechanism designer.
All the above allows us to argue that ESR is indeed the "right way" to generalize Serial rule to the general random voting domain. Both original and generalized rules have exactly the same nature: each gives the unique most "ordinally-egalitarian" way to compromise between agents.
Model and Results
Given are a set of agents N = f1; :::; ng and a set of alternatives A = fa 1 ; :::; a w g. Each agent i 2 N has arbitrary preferences R i , or i ; over A, which are represented by a partition of A into K i indi¤erence classes E Given an arbitrary lottery p = (p 1 ; :::; p w ), where p j = p(a j ), we will write p(E) = P a2E p(a). For any agent i and any ESR starts from the set of all feasible lotteries, and then repeatedly shrinks this set over time interval [0; 1]. This is done by sequentially introducing (the largest feasible) lower bounds on probabilities of certain indi¤erence classes from E in the …nal lottery. At each step, ESR only cares to guarantee each agent the largest share of objects from her top indi¤erence class still available for distributing. As we will see, ESR pursues an egalitarian goal to guarantee the best treatment for the worst o¤ agents. Aziz and Stursberg's de…nition is given by the following algorithm.
Each indi¤erence class E = E r i is represented by a "tower" growing over time, with the "ceiling" l t (E) 2 R + at time t. This ceiling represents the minimal guarantee for the probability the subset E of alternatives is to receive in the …nal lottery. During the course of the algorithm, agents climb up those towers (all with the same constant speed) and in doing that push up the ceilings, therefore increasing the lower bounds on probabilities of corresponding subsets.
All towers have ceilings zero at time = 0. Algorithm proceeds in stages. In stage 1, each agent starts by climbing the tower corresponding to her top indi¤erence class. A tower's height is frozen, if increasing it would result in nonexistence of a lottery satisfying all lower bounds for all towers. Once a tower is frozen, any agent at its ceiling falls o¤ it, and moves to the bottom of the tower corresponding to her next indi¤erence class 2 . Any agent in the middle of a frozen tower will continue to climb it until the frozen ceiling. Then she will fall o¤ and move to her next best tower. A stage ends whenever some agent falls o¤ some ceiling.
Notation: Let l Stage k. Compute (k) and N (k) (see the linear program below the algorithm's description), as well as towers to be frozen. Let
and agents'heights for the beginning of the next stage be h
(new ceilings, de…ned as maximum of the old ceiling and maximal of agents'heights over those who were climbing this tower during stage k). For all agents who fell o¤, i 2 N (k) , de…ne E (k+1) (i) to be the agent's i next indi¤erence class. For remaining agents, de…ne E (k+1) (i) = E (k) (i). Calculation of (k) and N (k) comes from solving the following Linear Program.
First, we …nd (k) by solving max subject to:
Then, for all i 2 N we run this program again, imposing = (k) , and max-2 It might be an already frozen tower! imizing the slack in the inequality
+ ; whenever objective function value is zero, we add corresponding i to N (k) . Thus, resulting N (k) is the largest (by inclusion) set of agents who create the "bottleneck" (prevent increasing (k) ). I.e., (k) and N (k) are computed as the largest ones so that there still exists a lottery p 2 (A) with p(S) = P a2S p(a)
Freeze (forever) ceilings of all towers which were climbed by at least one agent from N (k) .
Algorithm …nishes when all towers are frozen. Once it is …nished, ESR at the pro…le R is the set of "remaining" lotteries p; satisfying inequalities P a2S p(a) l (k) (S) for the last step k (and hence for all steps). It is straightforward to show (see [1] ) that for any pro…le R this set is essentially single-valued. Hence, ESR is indeed a random social choice rule. Moreover, it is easy to see that for any pro…le R, p 2 ESR(R) and (q utility equivalent to p) imply q 2 ESR(R). Thus, ESR(R) includes all lotteries utility equivalent to any one obtained by the algorithm above.
De…nition 1
The leximin order L on R q is de…ned as follows. For any x = (x 1 ; :::; x q ) 2 R q , let x = (x 1 ; :::; x q ) 2 R q be a permutation of the coordinates of vector x in the increasing order: x 1 ::: x q . We say that xLy if there is a j 2 f1; :::; qg such that x j > y j , while x i = y i for all i < j.
Theorem 1
For all preference pro…les R, ESR(R) is exactly the set of lotteries over (A) which leximin maximize the vector 3 of shares t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ).
Proof.
Fix an arbitrary preference pro…le R. Since they are utility equivalent, all p 2 ESR(R) result in the the same vector t p and same permutation-vector t p . Denote the corresponding permutation :
, we can assume that is such that (t p i (k)) < (t p i (r)) for any i, whenever k < r. In the algorithm, each agent i climbs towers corresponding to her indi¤erence classes E goes through each tower from bottom to top and never stops, we obtain that the total share she gets of objects from her …rst m indi¤erence classes t In stage k + 1 we …nd the largest such that p (E mi i ) = p E (k+1) (i) = P The same line of argument allows us to prove a parallel characterization. Let t 0 i (a) to be the total share of objects at least as good as a agent i gets. The vector t 0 = (t 0 i (a)) i;a has …xed length nw, no matter whether preferences are strict or not.
Theorem 1a
For all preference pro…les R, ESR(R) is also exactly the set of leximin maximizers of the t = (t 0 i (a)) i;a .
Serial rule for random assignment problem is known to be characterized by the same property as in our Theorem 1 (see [2] ). We hence obtain: Corollary
